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WHY AN INDEPENDENT APPOINTING
AUTHORITY IS NECESSARY TO CHOOSE
COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT PEOPLE IN CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT CASES
RonaldJ. Tabak*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The revised ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance
of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases require that an agency
"independent of the judiciary" be responsible for "ensuring that each
capital defendant in the jurisdiction receives high quality legal
representation."' This independent agency "and not the judiciary or
elected officials should select lawyers for specific cases.
These mandates reflect two realities that have become
overwhelmingly clear: (1) judges-whether initially elected, subject to
retention elections, or appointed-are subject to political pressures in
connection with capital punishment cases; and (2) lawyers whom judges
have appointed in capital punishment cases have frequently been of far
lower quality than could have been selected.
Accordingly, an entity whose members are free from the political
pressures that judges face, and have the requisite expertise and
commitment to effective representation of people facing the death
sentence, should be appointing counsel for these individuals.

*

Special Counsel, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP. Co-Chair of Death Penalty

of, and Special Counsel to, the American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and
Responsibilities.
1. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline 3.1 (rev. ed. 2003) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
2. ld. at3.1(B).
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INCUMBENT AND PROSPECTIVE JUDGES FACE POLITICAL
PRESSURES CONCERNING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

A.

Election, Re-election, and Retention Campaigns

Judges are either elected or face retention elections (in which voters
the
decide whether judges should remain on the bench) in thirty-two of
3
thirty-eight states in the United States that have capital punishment.
In 2003, the ABA's Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary
released its report, Justice in Jeopardy, which was the basis for a
resolution on judicial independence adopted at the ABA annual meeting
in August 2003.4 A consultant advised the Commission that "state court
judges around the country" have faced re-election attacks or opposition
in retention elections due to their adjudication of death penalty and other
criminal matters.5 These included, inter alia:
In 1992, Florida Justice Rosemary Barkett's retention was opposed by
the National Rifle Association and a group of prosecutors and police
officers, on the grounds that she was "soft on crime."
In 1992, Mississippi Justice James Robertson lost his reelection bid, on
the basis of a death penalty decision the Justice wrote.

In 1996, The Tennessee Conservative Union and other groups
successfully campaigned for the defeat of Tennessee Justice Penny
White on6 account of a decision she joined overturning a death
sentence.
During Justice White's retention election, the Republican Party
used this message: "If you support capital punishment, vote NO on
Penny White." 7 This and other attacks were based on her concurrence in
3. See Stephen B. Bright, Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why Full Habeas
Corpus Review by Independent Federal Judges Is Indispensable toProtecting Constitutional Rights,

78 Texas L. Rev. 1805, 1807 (2000).
4.

See ABA COMM'N ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, Justice in Jeopardy (2003),

available at http://www.manningproductions.com/ABA263/finalreport.pdf.

5. Id at 48.
6. Id. at 25.
7. Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch, Do Rising Threats to Judicial Independence
Preclude Due. Process in Capital Cases?, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123, 140 (1999)
[hereinafter Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch] (transcript of symposium) (comments of Penny

J. White).
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a decision in the only death penalty case that she ever adjudicated.'
Following her fifty-five percent to forty-five percent defeat in an
election with an 18.6% voter turnout, Tennessee's Governor said,
"[s]hould a judge look over his shoulder to the next election in
determining how to rule on a case? I hope so. I hope so." 9
Following her defeat, the Tennessee Supreme Court-which
previously had reversed or remanded about sixty percent of death
penalty cases l° -has mostly affirmed in capital cases. And its
administrative office has sent out press releases when there are
affirmances. 1 1
In 1999, Justice White spoke about judicial independence to a
group of judges. 12 After her talk, one judge said to her, "You know, I got
some really bad press over a bond motion not long ago. I'm here to tell
' 3
you, I haven't granted bond since, and I won't. I can't take the heat.'
Justice Robertson's defeat in the 1992 Mississippi Democratic
primary resulted from a "law and order" campaign by an opponent
backed by the state prosecutor's association. Justice Robertson was
attacked for stating in a concurring opinion that the Constitution forbids
capital punishment for rape-something the United States Supreme
Court had held in 1977.14 He was also attacked for supposedly believing
that the death penalty was not justified for killing an unarmed delivery
person in cold blood.15 Yet, his actual basis for dissent was that the trial
court had neglected to charge the jury on the meaning of the "heinous,
atrocious or cruel" aggravating factor, and ultimately, his view prevailed
after the 16United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded
the case.
In Texas, Court of Criminal Appeals Judge Charles F. Baird was
defeated in 1998 after dissenting from the denial of the writ to death row
inmate Karla Faye Tucker.' 7 The day following that decision, Baird's reelection campaign consultant accurately said, "[t]his is the worst thing
8.

See id.
at 138.

9.

Id. at 138-140.

10.
11.
12.
13.

See id. at 138.
Seeid. at 141.
See idat 137.
Id. at 141.

14. See Stephen B. Bright, PoliticalAttacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid
Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judgesfrom Office for UnpopularDecisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.

308,316-17 (1997).
15. See id.
at318.
16. Id
17. See Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch, supra note 7, at 133 (comments of Charles F.
Baird).
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you could have done for your political campaign."' 8 In contrast, another
member of the Court of Criminal Appeals promised during her campaign
that "[i]f you elect me, I will never, ever vote to reverse a capital murder
case," and she lived up to that promise over the next five years, in about
250 capital cases-in none of which she voted for a reversal.' 9
Even when death penalty-oriented attacks fail to defeat incumbent
judges, they can still have an impact on the courts. For example, North
Carolina Chief Justice James Exum decided never again to run for reelection after surviving a re-election campaign in which, despite his
numerous votes to uphold death sentences, he was attacked for his
personal opposition to capital punishment2.
A subsequent North Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice, Burley
Mitchell, said the following in a letter to the state's Law Enforcement
Officers Association eliciting its support for his re-election: "In the first
year of my leadership, the Supreme Court heard 87 criminal appeals. We
allowed only one new sentencing hearing and did not send a single
criminal case back for a new trial.'
Campaign appeals such as Justice Mitchell's are increasing in
frequency. In Alabama, incumbent Supreme Court Judge Kenneth
Ingram ran a commercial that began with videotape from the scene of a
rape/murder, followed by a statement that Judge Ingram had sentenced
the murderer to death, and then featured the victim's daughter saying
22
"[t]hank heaven Judge Ingram is on the supreme court.,
The trend of increased politicization of judicial retention elections
will probably continue, because "special interest groups have discovered
that they are vehicles by which offending judges
can be unseated and
23
state judicial policy making can be influenced.,
B. JudicialAppointments
Both at the state and federal levels, people who wish to be
appointed as judges, and judges who wish to be elevated to higher
courts, also face political pressures concerning capital punishment.

18. Id. at 133-34.
19. Id. at 134.
20. See James Exum, Politics& the Death Penalty: Can RationalDiscourse and Due Process
Survive the PerceivedPoliticalPressure?,21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 271-73 (1994).
21. Editorial, Impose Death on JudicialElections, SOUTHERN PINES PILOT, Oct. 7, 2002.
22. Ken Silverstein, The Judge as Lynch Mob, in MACHINERY OF DEATH: THE REALITY OF
AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY REGIME, at 84-85 (David R. Dow & Mark Dow ed., 2002).

23. Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Retention Elections: Lessons from the Defeat of
JusticesLanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 77 (1999).
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An egregious example at the state level is California Governor Gray
Davis. Dean Peter Keane of the Golden Gate University Law School
stated that several people who had been interviewed for possible judicial
appointments were "absolutely traumatized" by death penalty questions
they had been asked, and added that the Governor was requiring
potential judges to say "they thought the death penalty was the greatest
thing since sliced bread., 24 Davis' spokeswoman Hilary McLean said all
of Davis' judicial appointees will have "certainly indicated clearly that
they will uphold the law" on capital punishment, and that if they were
personally opposed to the death penalty, "[t]hat person would be asked
some additional questions about the process, about the death penalty. In
that instance, whether or not the 25person would be ultimately appointed
by the governor, I can't tell you.
At the federal level, ranking minority member on the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Orrin G. Hatch, who now chairs the Committee,
announced in 1993 that Republicans would challenge any judicial
nominees of the new President, Bill Clinton, who would "look for
excuses not to carry" out capital punishment.2 6 Republican staffers
pointed out that "the death penalty is a politically potent issue and worth
raising, even if they have limited success in opposing judicial
nominees. 27 Among those whom Senate Republicans unsuccessfully
opposed in their two years in the minority at the outset of the Clinton
administration were Rosemary Barkett and Martha Craig Daughtrey,
both of whom were confirmed for court of appeals positions. 28 The
Republicans gained control of the Senate in 1995, and continued to use
the death penalty as an issue in the judicial confirmation process.
The Republicans' position affected President Clinton's selections of
whom to nominate to the federal bench. 29 As then-NAACP Legal
Defense & Educational Fund assistant counsel George Kendall stated in
1999, ever since Senator Hatch's 1993 statement, the "White House has
refrained from nominating anyone who has a background in working on
cases where the death penalty was an issue and even other people who

24.

Maura Dolan, Execution Issue Clouds Davis' Judicial Selections, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13,

1999, at AI.
25. Id.
26. See Neil A. Lewis, G.O.P. to Challenge Judicial Nominees Who Oppose Death Penalty,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at A26.

27. Id.
28. See id.
29. See Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch, supra note 7, at 145-46 (comments of George
F. Kendall).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2003

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1105

have shown a sensitivity to human rights." 30 For example, President
Clinton did not nominate Jeff Coleman, a Jenner & Block partner with a
superb legal record (mostly in commercial cases) who had secured
habeas relief for a Georgia death row inmate whom he had represented
pro bono.3 1 Some Senate Judiciary members were upset by that, and by
Coleman's work on some uncontroversial civil liberties cases.32
In October 1999, the Senate defeated the federal district court
nomination of Missouri Supreme Court Justice Ronnie White. 3 All
Republican Senators, except one who was absent, voted against the
nomination, at the behest of Missouri Senator John Ashcroft, who was
about to run for re-election. 34 Senator Ashcroft asserted that Justice
White was "pro-criminal," had "a serious bias against the death penalty"
and had "a tremendous bent toward criminal activity." 35 These
accusations were extremely dubious, particularly since Justice White had
voted to affirm in most capital punishment cases, and was endorsed by
the Missouri police organization.3 6 Earlier in 1999, Missouri Senior
Judge Charles Blackmar, a Republican who formerly served as Chief
Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court, said that Ashcroft was
"tampering with the judiciary, not only in Missouri but in any state that
has the death penalty. He apparently is saying that a vote against the
death penalty
is activist or liberal and a vote for it is apparently all
37
right.
What is significant for the purposes of this Article is not the
inaccuracy of the charges against Justice White, but that those who
ended up defending him-and attacking Ashcroft in 2001, when he was
up for confirmation as United States Attorney General--did so largely
on the basis of the high percentage of death penalty cases in which he
had voted to affirm. This in and of itself sent a signal to all would-be
federal judges, and all incumbent federal judges who hoped to be
appointed to higher courts, that they had better make sure that they not
only did not vote to overturn the death penalty in controversial cases but

30. Id. at 144.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Seeid. at 145.
See id. at 144-45.
See Anthony Lewis, Hypocrites in Power,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1999, at A25.
See id.

35. Id.
36. See id.
37.

Ray Hartman, More Deathly Politicsfrom John Ashcroft, RIVERFRONT TIMES, Aug. 11,

1999.
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a very high percentage of affirmances in
that they must also maintain
38

capital punishment cases.
III.

JUDGES HAVE APPOINTED INEFFECTUAL LAWYERS IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES

There is a pervasive national problem in the quality of lawyers
whom judges have appointed to represent indigent people facing capital
punishment.
In July 2001, United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor pointed to this problem. She said that due to this serious issue,
"[p]erhaps it's time to look at minimum standards for appointed counsel

in death cases and adequate compensation for appointed counsel when
they are used.",39 Earlier that year, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said, "I
have yet to see a death case among the dozens coming to the Supreme
Court on eve-of-execution stay applications in which the defendant was
well represented at trial."4 °

Newspaper accounts have pointed to major problems in various
states. For example, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer reported that in nearly
20% of capital cases since 1981, the "court-appointed lawyers ...' had

been, or were later, disbarred, suspended or criminally prosecuted."'
The Tennessean reported that "dozens of lawyers who have

defended clients facing the death penalty in Tennessee have been in

trouble themselves-disciplined by the state for unethical or illegal
activities. Eleven of them appear on a current list of lawyers who meet

Tennessee Supreme Court standards for future appointment in death
penalty cases. ' ' 2 It later reported that the head of a state appellate
representation office had testified that Tennessee judges appoint the

38. To put this matter in perspective, one should note that during the period 1973-1995 "of
every 100 death sentences imposed, forty-seven [were] reversed at the state level, on direct appeal
or collateral review. An additional twenty-one [were] overturned on federal habeas." GUIDELINES,
supra note 1, n.46 (citing JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES INCAPITAL
CASES, 1973-1995, pt. I, app. A, at 5-6 (2000)).
39. O'Connor Questions Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at A9.
40. Anne Gearan, Supreme Court Justice Supports Death Penalty Moratorium, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Apr. 10, 2001; see GUIDELINES, supranote 1, at Guideline 1.1, text accompanying note 30.
41. Lise Olsen, Capital Defense on the Cheap; In Clark County, Overworked Defense
Lawyers are Paid Cut-rate Fees, Epitomizing the Break Down of the State's Public-Defense System,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 8,2001, at Al.
42. John Shiffman, Troubled Lawyers Still Allowed to Work Death Cases, THE TENNESSEAN,
July 25, 2001.
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same ineffectual
trial lawyers "over and over again" in death penalty
3
cases.

4

In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, a Philadelphia Inquirer investigation
disclosed that "Philadelphia's poor defendants often find themselves
being represented by ward leaders, ward committeemen, failed
politicians, the sons of judges and party leaders and contributors to the
judges's election campaigns. 4 4 The Inquirer further reported that the
attorney who one year was appointed the most times, 34, to homicide
cases was a former judge who had been removed from the bench for
improper conduct.45 The Inquirer found that "even officials in charge of
the system say they wouldn't want to be represented in Traffic Court by
some of46the people appointed to defend poor people accused of
murder.,
Unsurprisingly, a greatly disproportionate percentage of those
sentenced to death in Pennsylvania are from Philadelphia. This is due
not only to its district attorney's office having a much greater inclination
to seek the death penalty than other district attorneys' offices in the state,
but also to the abysmal representation provided by judge-appointed
lawyers in Philadelphia cases. One result of the Philadelphia Inquirer
investigation was that the Philadelphia Public Defender's office was
permitted for the first time to represent defendants facing the death
penalty. Thereafter, no one represented by that office has been sentenced
to death, whereas numerous defendants who have been represented by
judge-appointed counsel have received death sentences.47
In North Carolina, an October 15, 2002 report by the Common
Sense Foundation 48 stated that more than one in six of North Carolina's
death row inmates were represented at trial by attorneys whom the North
Carolina State Bar has disciplined. 49 A North Carolina attorney who was
not disciplined conceded that during the trial of Ronald Wayne Frye, the
lawyer "was drinking heavily,.., downing nearly a pint of [eighty]43.
44.

See Duren Cheek, Counsel's Competence Questioned, THE TENNESSEAN, Dec. 7, 2001.
Fredric N. Tulsky, Big-time Trials, Small Time Defenses, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 14,

1992, at A 1.
45. See Roxanne Patel & Fredric N. Tulsky, The Former City Judge Who Defended 34
Murder Suspects in a Year, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 14, 1992, at A8.

46. Tulsky, supra note 44.
47.
unfair,

Steve Brewer & Mike Tolson, Court-appointed defense: Critics charge the system is
HOUSTON
CHRONICLE
(Feb.
6,
2001),
available
at

http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/special/penalty/816535 (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
48. COMMON SENSE FOUND., LIFE AND DEATH LOTTERY (Oct. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.coinmon-sense.org/?fnoc=./consider_this/consider-this021015.
49. See id; Life or Death Matter: New Report Questions Fairness of N.C. Murder Trials,

CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 22, 2002, at A 16.
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proof rum every afternoon" and that he had been "in a car wreck about
the same time and was found with a near-lethal blood-alcohol level of
0.44%/o-at 11 a.m.,, 50 The jury that sentenced Frye to death heard almost
nothing about his "nightmarish childhood," during which "his alcoholic
parents gave him away at a diner" at age 4, his new father beat him
"with a bullwhip," and he was "shuffled from family to family, six
changes in all." 51 Frye was executed on August 31, 2001.52 Another
lawyer who was not disciplined was Tim Merritt, who was dying of
cancer during Bobby Lee Harris' trial and took prescription drugs to
ease his pain. His co-counsel was so disturbed at Merritt's
strange,
53
harmful conduct that he asked him, "Whose side are you on?,
In 2002, California-which has experienced considerable problems
with the quality of appointed counsel in death penalty cases-adopted
qualification standards for death penalty defense counsel. 4 However, the
rule adopting these standards has a loophole allowing the trial judge to
appoint someone who does not meet the standards 55 and "leaves the
selection of a defense lawyer to the judge, who may be inexperienced in
death penalty cases or prey to local pressures.. 56 Chief Justice Ronald
George stated that at least the existence of the standards would help
where the same ineffectual lawyer has been representing defendants in
capital cases for years, since the trial judge will now have a ground on
which to say, "I can turn him down. 57
A Texas State Bar Committee study in 2000, entitled Muting
Gideon 's Trumpet, showed that many trial judges used a patronage
system to appoint lawyers for indigent defendants.5 8 Those appointed by
these judges made campaign donations to them.5 9 These lawyers were
expected to help the judge end the cases quickly.6 ° One former judge
recalled a colleague, George Walker, who appointed Joe Cannon to

50. Jeffrey Gettleman, Execution Ends Debatable Case, L. A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2001, at Al.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. See Bob Burtman, Criminal Injustice, INDEPENDENT ONLINE, Oct. 16, 2002.
54. Clair Cooper, Bar Raisedfor Lawyers in Death Penalty Cases, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec.
14,2002.

55. See id.
56. See id
57. See id.
58. See ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, MUTING GIDEON'S TRUMPET: THE
CRISIS IN INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN TEXAS
13 (Sept. 2000), available at

http://www.uta.edu/pols/moore/indigent/last.pdf.
59. See id.
60. See id.
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handle death penalty cases. 61 The former judge remarked that, "Joe was
a nice man, but he was incompetent to handle capital cases. He was
George's buddy. He got the cases because he moved them. There was
pressure-keep costs down, keep things moving. 62
Texas' problems with indigent representation in death penalty cases
pervades not only the trial and appeals levels, but also state postconviction proceedings, in which the courts also appoint counsel.63 In
December 2002, the Texas Defender Service issued a scathing report,
Lethal Indifference, concerning the assignment of lawyers for postconviction proceedings.6 4 The report concluded that in cases since 1995,
Texas death row inmates had a one in three chance of being executed
without decent investigation or argument by counsel. 65 The report found
that incompetent and inexperienced counsel were often appointed,
sometimes notwithstanding drug or serious mental problems. 66 Yet, as
the Austin American-Statesman editorialized, the head-in-the-sand
response of the presiding judge of the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals-which had itself been responsible for several years' worth of
inadequate appointments---"only perpetuates the appearance that the
court is more interested in efficiency and moving people through the
system than in justice., 67
Even more bizarre was that court's response to the case of Leonard
Uresti Rojas, who was executed on December 4, 2002.68 Over two
months later, in February 2003, three members of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals issued a dissent from the court's rejection of Rojas'
assertion that he had had ineffective counsel in his post-conviction
proceeding.69 The dissent noted that the attorney whom the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals assigned to handle the post-conviction case had no
death penalty experience, had been sanctioned three times by the state
bar association, had a bipolar disorder during the case, and admitted to
61. See Michael Hall, Death isn't
Fair, TEX. MONTHLY, Dec. 2002, at 122.
62. Id.
63. See generally TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, LETHAL INDIFFERENCE:

THE FATAL
COMBINATION OF INCOMPETENT AT7ORNEYS AND UNACCOUNTABLE COURTS IN TEXAS DEATH
PENALTY APPEALS (2002) [hereinafter LETHAL INDIFFERENCE].
64. See id; see also Jim Yardley, Texas Death Row Appeals Lawyers Criticized,N.Y. TIMES,

Dec.3, 2002, at A29.
65.

See LETHAL INDIFFERENCE at 2.

66. See id.
at 22.
67. Editorial, Poor Defendants Deserve Competent Appellate Lawyers, AUSTIN AMERICANSTATESMAN, Dec. 5, 2002, at A16.
68. See Michael King & Jordan Smith, Is the CCA "'Competent"?,AUSTIN CHRONICLE, Feb.
21, 2003.
69. See id.
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having done only minimal work and to having missed key deadlines.7 °
Judge Tom Price, who wrote the dissent, reiterated his view, first
expressed in a January 2002 dissent, that the court should recognize the
right to post-conviction counsel who is "more than a human being with a
71
law license and a pulse."
IV.

CONCLUSION

When judges appoint counsel in capital cases, the appointed
lawyers face a potential conflict of interest between the desire to please
the judge-so that the lawyers will be appointed in other cases-and
their obligation to represent their client zealously. In view of the
political pressures faced by judges, whether they face retention elections,
must run for re-election, or hope for appointment to higher courts, there
is substantial danger that judges will appoint lawyers who are
disinclined or unable to raise a vigorous defense or to make crucial
objections.
Experience has shown that this is not only a danger; it is a systemic
reality in all sections of the United States. As a result, all too many
defendants have been executed more because of how badly their courtappointed lawyers have performed than because of how bad their
conduct was.
The revised Guidelines thus stand on solid ground in recognizing
that one necessary, albeit hardly sufficient, ingredient of any solution to
the problem of ineffective defense representation in death penalty cases
is to have independent appointing authorities appoint counsel for
indigent people facing capital punishment.

70. See id.
71. Ed Timms & Diane Jennings, Court Limits Death-Row Appeals; State Panel: Appointed
Attorneys Need Not Be Effective, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 3,2002, at A17.
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